We are planning the following Jetson Thor T264 / JP7.2 / R39.2 configuration:
Configuration:
RSA-3K PKC-only secure boot
Full 16-entry PKC keylist, key_id 0..15, each entry containing a distinct public key
No SBK
No fTPM
PscOemKdk1 is used as the per-device OP-TEE EKB root
We would appreciate confirmation of the following points.
BootSecurityInfo value and readback/OR rule
For the configuration above, what is the exact BootSecurityInfo value?
Should it be 0x200, or another value such as 0x220 when the PKC revocation policy is enabled? Please provide the bit definitions for all relevant BootSecurityInfo bits.
Before fuse burning, is BootSecurityInfo readback required? If so, please provide:
the specific command or method to read BootSecurityInfo;
the exact merge algorithm, including whether a bitwise OR with the readback value is required;
the expected post-burn readback value.
Minimum fuse fields for PscOemKdk1
When PscOemKdk1 is used only as the OP-TEE EKB root:
Is any purpose fuse or ODM-static fuse required?
Are OespOemKdk1, SbOemKdk1, KDK0, or any other KDK-domain fuse required?
Please provide the minimum fuse field set, including exact fuse names, sizes, value constraints, and XML programming order.
We are looking for the official Thor R39.2 fuse specification and recommended production procedure.
there’re two ways for reading fuse variables.
there’s nv_fuse_read.sh script to read fuse variables from the target.
or.. you may put your device enter forced-recovery mode, and execute odmfuseread.sh to read fuse via host machine.
regrading to KDK1.
according to Prepare K1/K2/KDK1 Keys, you can use the KDK1 key as the EKB fuse key.
note,
fuse burning operations are high-risk because they cannot be reversed. NVIDIA strongly recommends that you use the --test option to verify fuse burning operations before you perform them.
We understand that for our PKC-only configuration with PKC revocation enabled, the recommended value is 0x220
Please also confirm the following points.
Is 0x220 sufficient for EKB encryption/decryption using PscOemKdk1, or is any additional bit required?
Is tag 4 mandatory when using PscOemKdk1?
Our product needs to use PscOemKdk1 only as the EKB fuse key and add a custom EKB tag 6 containing our own confidential data. We do not intend to use UEFI variable protection or provide a UEFI variable authentication key.
The R39.2 documentation states that when PscOemKdk1 is burned, a UEFI variable authentication key must be present in the EKB; otherwise UEFI authentication and boot may fail.
Is there an officially supported configuration that allows us to omit tag 4 while still booting successfully after PscOemKdk1 is burned?
BTW, may I have more details for such authentication scheme?
it’s PKC for sign, if PKC is burned, then the KEYFILE users provide is for signing the images.
also, it’s SBK for encryption, if SBK is burned, then the SBKFILE users provide is for encrypting the images.
Our design objective is to use RSA-3072 PKC to authenticate the boot images, with the complete 16-entry PKC keylist (key_id=0..15) and PKC revocation enabled.
SBK is not burned, and SBK encryption is not used for the boot images. PscOemKdk1 is intended only as a per-device EKB fuse root key for EKB encryption/decryption; it is not intended to function as SBK or to encrypt the boot images.
FYI,
PKC authenticates boot images, SBK encrypts boot images, and KDK1 independently protects the EKB.
SBK is not required for EKB encryption/decryption.
Tag 4 is the EKB entry containing the 128-bit UEFI variable authentication key.
omitting tag 4 is not supported and is likely to cause boot failure.
you may generate a random auth_t264.key as tag 4, even if you do not otherwise intend to use UEFI variable protection,
for instance, $ python3 gen_ekb.py -chip t264 -oem_kdk1_key oem_kdk1.key -in_auth_key auth_t264.key -out eks_t264.img gen_ekb.py encodes that key (auth_t264.key in the EKB) with Key_tag = 4.
Thank you for the information.
Our intended configuration is to use PKC only to authenticate the boot images, without using SBK for encryption. For independent EKB protection, we will use tag 4. If we later manually modify the BootOrder through the UEFI menu, the tag 4 key itself will not prevent boot?
Is this fuse configuration sufficient for our requirements, or are any additional fuse fields required?
please see-also Customizing the Default Boot Order in the UEFI Menu.
when BootOrder is changed and saved through the UEFI menu, the trusted UEFI/OP-TEE variable service authenticates the updated variable using the tag 4 key. the next boot should therefore accept the new BootOrder.
for production, you may have UEFI Variable Protection which secures UEFI variables.
please aware below,
after the SecurityMode (also known as odm_production_mode) fuse is burned with a value of 0x1, all additional fuse write requests will be blocked.