Hello community,
I’m the founder of a startup in the Inception program, focused on developing a green hosting platform. Our project has been stalled by a complex security incident, and I’m hoping to get some input since we can’t exactly afford a cybersecurity firm.
This isn’t a standard support request, but rather a complex technical puzzle involving a popular hosting software vendor.
Technical Timeline & Key Findings:
The incident unfolded in several distinct phases:
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Phase 1: Initial Instability: The incident began with repeatable
SIGSEGV(Segmentation Fault) crashes on a new dedicated server, traced directly to the vendor’s corephp-fpmprocess byapportlogs. This instability was reported but dismissed as a non-security issue by the vendor’s support management. -
Phase 2: Architectural Anomalies: A deeper investigation of the production environment revealed an undeclared stack running on my server, including GraphQL and Sentry, with all traffic being proxied through Caddy. This reverse proxy was installed by a “security” module from their marketplace. Support claimed this component was non-operational, yet it remained active and running on the server (visible via SSH) even after the module was uninstalled and the subscription had lapsed.
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Phase 3: Credential Compromise via Supply Chain: My entire password vault was compromised. The entry vector was the vendor’s own authorized backup application, which had privileged OAuth access to my OneDrive and accessed a forgotten password export file stored there.
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Phase 4: Escalation & Subsequent Events: Immediately following my escalation of these findings to the vendor’s DPO, a series of hostile events began:
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A persistent, high-volume Layer 7 botnet assault was launched against my new infrastructure from a diverse range of cloud providers (Hetzner, Alibaba, etc.).
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I found, by Cloudflare, an email in my name sent to aws, which it wasn’t me.
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I’m being monitored on every single website i put online by this software even when i don’t use it anymore, as i stopped 04/08, among other stuff.
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Evidence Available for Private Review: I have a comprehensive dossier with logs, screenshots, and documentation for every claim made above, including a Cloudflare audit log showing the third-party security module creating firewall rules via API key.
My Questions for this Community:
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From a purely technical standpoint, does the combination of an undeclared reverse proxy (Caddy), GraphQL, and Sentry on a customer server constitute a potential architectural backdoor for traffic inspection or data exfiltration?
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What are the recommended forensic next steps for analyzing a persistent, “zombie” component like Caddy to determine its activity after the parent application has been removed?
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For those who have dealt with complex security incidents involving software vendors, what are the best practices for disclosure and interaction when direct communication appears to trigger escalating hostile activity?
I’m looking for guidance or any kind of help is welcomed, thank you.